A note on nonlinear taxation in an overlapping generations model by Brett, Craig
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A note on nonlinear taxation in an
overlapping generations model
Craig Brett
Universtiy of Essex
15. August 1998
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8776/
MPRA Paper No. 8776, posted 16. May 2008 13:55 UTC
A Note on Nonlinear Taxation in an Overlapping
Generations Model
Craig Brett∗
July 1997
Current version: August 1998
Department of Economics, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Eng-
land. Email: craig@essex.ac.uk. Tel: +44 1206 872754.
∗ This paper arose out of discussions in a graduate Public Economics course
at the University of Essex during Spring 1997 and Spring 1998. I thank the
students on that course for their comments. Errors, omissions and views are
entirely my own.
Abstract:
This paper analyses the conditions under which savings should receive special
tax treatment. A two–class overlapping generation model is presented, and
a simple condition for the taxation or subsidisation of savings is derived and
interpreted.
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1 Introduction
There is a longstanding debate among economists on the choice of the
personal tax base.1 The two main contenders for the tax base are consump-
tion and income. The primary distinction between the two is that under
the former savings are exempt from taxation. Meanwhile, some argue that
savings are taxed twice under the latter (when income is ﬁrst earned and
again when it bears interest). Double taxation per se is not a suﬃcient rea-
son to justify the special treatment (or exemption) of savings from the tax
base. Yet, it has been argued that a tax on savings leads to an ineﬃciently
low amount of savings and capital formation. Moreover, the consumption tax
base has several administrative advantages, arising mainly from the diﬃculty
in measuring and taxing some forms of asset income. Still, there remains the
possibility that taxes on savings may be of some use in counterbalancing the
distortions imposed by labour income taxation. It is also reasonable to ex-
pect that, under some circumstances, an exclusion of asset income from the
tax base may make the tax system more inequitable.
Any attempt to shed light on the tax base issue must be framed inside
a dynamic model of the economy, if only because the saving decision is in-
tertemporal. This note outlines one of the simplest models in which this
question can be addressed. It is an attempt to embed the standard model of
personal income taxation, in the Mirrlees (1971) tradition, into an overlap-
ping generations model. The distortionary eﬀects of personal income taxation
are modelled as arising out of information asymmetry between the taxation
authority and individuals. The population of workers is divided into two
classes, diﬀering in productivity. Following the standard set of assumptions,
1See Kesselman (1994) and Boadway and Wildasin (1994) for surveys of the issues
involved.
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the taxation authority is assumed to observe only market earnings, which
is a mixture of innate ability and hours of work. The dynamic structure
is equally simple, deriving in a straightforward way from a commonly used
deterministic overlapping generations model.
Whilst this type of analysis has been carried out before,2 the current
framework is relatively simple. The two–class model has proven to be ﬂexible
enough to formulate extensions of the static nonlinear income tax model that
incorporate such items as public expenditure (Boadway and Keen (1993),
Boadway and Marchand (1995)) and income maintenance (Besley and Coate
(1992)). It is hoped that the current model could be used in a similar way.3
The remainder of this note is organised as follows. The next section pro-
vides a description of the model, paying careful attention to the information
assumptions contained therein. Section 3 derives some qualitative features of
optimal taxation in this environment, and derives a condition under which it
is optimal to tax (or subsidise) savings. Some concluding remarks are then
oﬀered.
2 The Model
There are two consumers born each period. During the ﬁrst period of
their lives, they supply labour elastically and they consume. In the second
period of life, each individual retires. Within a generation, individuals diﬀer
in productivity. Denote the productivity of a person of type i by ai, i = 1, 2,
a1 < a2. Thus, if a person supplies li units of labour, her eﬀective labour
is yi := aili. At any date (apart from the start–up period), t, the following
2See Myles (1995, pp. 509–514) for a textbook treatment of the best–known of these
analyses — that of Ordover and Phelps (1979).
3Indeed, since the ﬁrst version of this note was written, Pirttila¨ and Tuomala (1998)
have provided an extension to the case of the provision of a public good.
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individuals are alive:
• two young individuals, one of type a1, the other with productivity a2;
• two retired individuals, born at time t − 1, living oﬀ the proceeds of
their savings.
Individuals derive utility from consumption when young (c) and consump-
tion during retirement (x). Moreover, they are assumed to have a disutility
of labour. The utility of a person of type i born at time t is given by4
uti := U(c
t
i, x
t
i, l
t
i) = U(c
t
i, x
t
i,
yti
ai
). (1)
Total consumption at time t is made up of consumption by the young
born at that date and the spending–in–retirement of those born at date t−1.
yt := yt1 + y
t
2 denotes the total eﬀective labour supplied by the generation
born at time t.
Total output at any date t is a function of the capital stock, kt, and
total eﬀective labour. Let F (kt, yt) be the production function, assumed to
exhibit constant returns to scale. The prices of inputs are determined by the
proﬁt–maximisation conditions:
rt = Fk(k
t, yt); wt = Fy(k
t, yt), (2)
where wt is the price of eﬀective labour. Thus the before–tax income of an
individual is given by
zti := w
tail
t
i = w
tyti . (3)
4Throughout this analysis, subscripts are used to denote the type of an individual,
whilst superscripts denote the date of birth of an individual. Quantities denoted without
subscripts are within–period aggregates.
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Depreciation is assumed away, so that the capital stock evolves according
to the equation:
kt+1 = F (kt, yt) + kt − ct − xt−1. (4)
That is, capital next period equals current output plus current capital less
total consumption of those currently alive.
It is assumed that the government can observe both z and w, but that it
cannot observe l. This accords with the standard assumptions of nonlinear
tax theory. It is equivalent to say that the planner can observe y. Implicitly,
then, the planner can also observe k. Because l is unobserved, the planner
must resort to distortionary taxation. Exactly which tax instruments are
available to the planner depend on the further assumptions one makes about
the use of non–income information. It is assumed that the planner knows
the age of each individual, so that the young cannot pretend to be old,
nor can the old pretend to be young. The old do not work, so there is no
direct interaction between them and the income tax schedule. Thus, the only
concern is that the young may have incentive to misrepresent their ability.
Given that information about type is revealed when young, the planner
can distinguish between retirees of the same generation. Thus, without loss
of generality, it is assumed that the tax on consumption of the old is pre–
paid at the end of the ﬁrst period of life. Because retirees simply consume
their after–tax savings, one need not worry about the “ratchet eﬀect”. No
economically meaningful decision made in the second period of life.
The taxation authority is assumed to select a tax system that speciﬁes an
amount of tax to be paid on labour income, along with a levy on the amount
of savings. Equivalently, it can be modelled as choosing the consumption
levels and eﬀective labour time for each type of worker at each date in time,
subject to incentive compatibility constraints. I analyse only the case in
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which a person of high ability may wish to misrepresent its type. That is, at
each date, only one form of self–selection constraints is considered, namely
U(ct2, x
t
2,
yt2
a2
) ≥ U(ct1, xt1,
yt1
a2
) t = 1, 2, . . . (5)
This is the case most commonly analysed in the literature. A more general
analysis can be easily carried out, but would not shed a great deal more light
on the issues addressed in this note.
3 Optimal Taxation Rules
The planner is assumed to be Paretian both across and within generations.
If we ignore the generation that is born old (generation 0), we may write the
planner’s objective function as
W (u11, u
1
2, . . . , u
t
1, u
t
2, . . . ).
For this speciﬁcation of objectives, the problem of designing an optimal tax-
ation mechanism may be stated in mathematical terms as:
max
c1,c2,x1,x2,y1,y2,k
W
(
U(c11, x
1
1,
y11
a1
), U(c12, x
1
2,
y12
a2
), . . .
)
(6)
subject to
F (kt, yt) + kt − ct − xt−1 ≥ kt+1 t = 1, 2, . . . (7)
U(ct2, x
t
2,
yt2
a2
) ≥ U(ct1, xt1,
yt1
a2
) t = 1, 2, . . . (8)
where zi := (z
t
i)
∞
t=1, for any variable z. It is helpful to consider the (inﬁnite)
Lagrangean for this problem, namely:
L := W(U(c11, x11, y
1
1
a1
), U(c12, x
1
2,
y12
a2
), . . .
)
+
∞∑
t=1
ρt
[
F (kt, yt) + kt − ct − xt−1 − kt+1] (9)
+
∞∑
t=1
µt
[
U(ct2, x
t
2,
yt2
a2
)− U(ct1, xt1,
yt1
a2
)
]
.
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Ordover and Phelps (1979) analysed a planner’s problem very similar
to the one above, but with a continuum of types. They found that the
traditional ‘no distortion at the top’ result to hold for both labour taxation
and savings taxation. The current model gives rise to the same conclusion.
For completeness, it is presented in the following result.
Result 1 For all generations, agents of type 2 face a zero marginal rate of
taxation on both labour income and savings.
Proof : Let MU tc,i be the marginal utility of ﬁrst–period consumption for a
person of type i born at time t, and let
αti :=
∂W (·)
∂uti
(10)
be the marginal social valuation of an increase in the utility of an individual
of type i born at date t. Denote by M̂U
t
c,2 the marginal utility of consumption
for a person of type 2 born at time t, evaluated at the bundle designed for
the person of type 1 born at time t. That is, we follow the Boadway and
Keen (1993) convention of using “hats” to denote the potential mimicker.
MU tx,i and similar expressions have analogous meaning.
The ﬁrst order condition for the planner’s maximisation problem include:
kt : ρ
t
[
Fk(kt, yt) + 1
]− ρt−1 = 0; (11)
ct1 : α
t
1MU
t
c,1 − µtM̂U
t
c,2 − ρt = 0; (12)
ct2 : (α
t
2 + µ
t)MU tc,2 − ρt = 0; (13)
xt1 : α
t
1MU
t
x,1 − µtM̂U
t
x,2 − ρt+1 = 0; (14)
xt2 : (α
t
2 + µ
t)MU tx,2 − ρt+1 = 0; (15)
yt1 : α
t
1MU
t
l,1
1
a1
− µtM̂U tl,2
1
a2
+ ρtFy(kt, yt) = 0; (16)
yt2 : (α
t
2 + µ
t)MU tl,2
1
a2
+ ρtFy(kt, yt) = 0. (17)
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Leading (11) by one period yields
ρt = ρt+1
[
Fk(kt+1, yt+1) + 1
] ⇒ ρt+1 = ρt
1 + Fk(kt+1, yt+1)
. (18)
Using (18), the conditions rt+1 = Fk(k
t+1, yt+1) and wt = Fy(k
t, yt), and
taking ratios of (13), (15) and (17) yields:
MU tl,2
MU tc,2
= −a2wt; (19)
MU tc,2
MU tx,2
= 1 + rt+1. (20)
Relation (19) implies that the marginal rate of substituion between labour
and consumption equals the wage rate for agent of type 2 born at time t.
Relation (20) says that the marginal rate of substitution between present
and future consumption for high–ability agents equals the gross rate of inter-
est. Hence, it is never optimal to distort the savings decision of high–ability
agents. 
The analysis of Ordover and Phelps also uncovered a set of conditions
under which it is optimal to not tax the savings of any individuals at the
marginal; that is, when labour is separable from consumption in utility. A
similar ﬁnding holds in the present model, and is a direct consequence of the
following, more general, result.
Result 2 The following statements hold for each generation of agents of type
1;
1. The implicit marginal rate of income tax is positive.
2. There is an implicit positive (negative) marginal tax rate on savings if
and only if
Uc(c
1
1, x
1
1,
y11
a1
)
Ux(c11, x
1
1,
y11
a1
)
> (<)
Uc(c
1
1, x
1
1,
y11
a2
)
Ux(c11, x
1
1,
y11
a2
)
. (21)
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Proof : Taking ratios of the ﬁrst order conditions (12), (14) and (16) yields:
αt1MU
t
l,1
1
a1
− µtM̂U tl,2 1a2
αt1MU
t
c,1 − µtM̂U
t
c,2
= −wt (22)
αt1MU
t
c,1 − µtM̂U
t
c,2
αt1MU
t
x,1 − µtM̂U
t
x,2
= 1 + rt+1. (23)
Equation (22) implies
MU tl,1
MU tc,1
< −a1wt, (24)
establishing Statement i.).
Savings are taxed at a non–negative marginal rate if and only if
MRStc1,x1 =
MU tc,1
MU tx,1
≤ 1 + rt+1. (25)
Upon substitution of (23) into (25), one may deduce the following chain of
equivalent statements.
MU tc,1
MU tx,1
≤ α
t
1MU
t
c,1 − µtM̂U
t
c,2
αt1MU
t
x,1 − µtM̂U
t
x,2
(26)
MU tc,1
[
αt1MU
t
x,1 − µtM̂U
t
x,2
] ≤MU tx,1[αt1MU tc,1 − µtM̂U tc,2] (27)
−µtMU tc,1M̂U
t
x,2 ≤ −µtMU tx,1M̂U
t
c,2 (28)
MU tc,1
MU tx,1
≥ M̂U
t
c,2
M̂U
t
x,2
. (29)
Note: the multiplication carried out in the ﬁrst step does not change the
sense of the inequality, because the terms in square brackets are all positive.
This can be checked by looking at the ﬁrst–order conditions and noting that
the multipliers are all positive. Statement ii.) follows. 
Statement i.) is a restatement of the standard result of a positive marginal
rate of taxation for agents of low type (cf. Guesnerie and Seade (1982)). It
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holds in the current model because there is only one potential mimicker of the
individual of type 1 born at time t, the type–2 individual born at the same
time. Preventing this form of mimicking requires a downward distortion of
the labour supply of type–1 agents.
Relation (21) is easily interpreted in light of the work by Boadway and
Keen (1993). It says that it is optimal to tax savings if and only if mimickers
value future consumption more than individuals of type 1 do. To see why
this is the case, consider an initial situation in which savings are untaxed
for all agents of some generation t. Now consider increasing ct1 by one unit,
decreasing the future consumption of that same individual by MRStc1,x1 =
1+rt+1 (because saving is untaxed at the margin). This change is production
feasible, and leaves the aﬀected agent equally well oﬀ as before. However,
when (21) is satisﬁed, the young agent of type 2 at time t ﬁnds mimicking
less attractive. Thus, the self–selection constraint is slackened, and a welfare
improvement can be eﬀected.
4 Concluding Remarks
This note has outlined a framework for analysing the optimality of sav-
ings taxation in an overlapping generations setting. It was found that saving
should be taxed at the margin if and only if high ability agents have, in some
sense, a greater preference for future consumption. Taxing future consump-
tion then becomes a means to enhance the eﬀectiveness of redistribution.
This intuitive result is presented as an illustration of simpliﬁcation aﬀorded
by treating the two–type model.
Of course, this note presents only a preliminary step on the road to un-
derstanding nonlinear taxation in dynamic settings. Importantly, there is an
assumption that agents can be induced to reveal their type when young. This
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assumption may not be too bad in the current context, given that old indi-
viduals supply no labour. However, when labour is supplied in many periods
of life, the link between simple revelation mechanisms and tax schedules is
lost.5 The consequences for (modelling) optimal tax schedules remain largely
unexplored.
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